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Abstract
Safety is a core issue in the railway operation. In particular, as witnessed by accident/incident statistics, railway level
crossing (LX) safety is one of the most critical points in railways. In the present paper, a Bayesian network (BN) based
framework for causal reasoning related to risk analysis is proposed. It consists of a set of integrated stages, namely
risk scenario definition, real field data collection and processing, BN model establishment and model performance
validation. In particular, causal structural constraints are introduced to the framework for the purpose of combining
empirical knowledge with automatic learning approaches, thus to identify effective causalities and avoid inappropriate
structural connections. Then, the proposed framework is applied to risk analysis of LX accidents in France. In details,
the BN risk model is established on the basis of real field data and the model performance is validated. Moreover,
forward and reverse inferences based on the BN risk model are performed to predict LX accident occurrence and
quantify the contribution degree of various impacting factors respectively, so as to identify the riskiest factors. Besides,
influence strength and sensitivity analyses are further carried out to scrutinize the influence strength of various causal
factors on the LX accident occurrence likelihood and determine which factors the LX accident occurrence is most
sensitive to. The main outputs of our study attest that the proposed framework is sound and effective in terms of risk
reasoning analysis and offers significant insights on exploring practical recommendations to prevent LX accidents.
Keywords: Level crossing safety, Risk analysis, Bayesian network modeling, Causality identification, Influence and
sensitivity analysis;
1. Context and related works
On December 14, 2017, a train and a school bus collided at a railway Level crossing (LX) near Perpignan in
southern France, killing 6 children between 8 and 14 years old and injuring more than 20 others (Willsher, 2017). The
accident happened at an automatic LX (SAL2, refer to section 5.1) on a two-lane road as the bus crossed a single-track
railway line secured by a barrier and warning lights in each direction. LXs are potentially hazardous locations where
trains, road vehicles and pedestrians move in close proximity. LX safety remains one of the most critical issues for
railways despite an ever-increasing focus on improving design and application practices (Ghazel, 2009). In France, the
railway network shows more than 18,000 LXs for 30,000 km of railway lines, which are crossed daily by 16 million
vehicles on average, and around 13,000 LXs show heavy road and railway traffic (Liang et al., 2018a, 2017b; SNCF
Re´seau, 2011). Despite numerous measures already taken to improve the LX safety in 2016, there were 111 collisions
at LXs in France leading to 31 deaths (Liang et al., 2017c). About 90% of the accidents involved cars or light vehicles,
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reported by SNCF Re´seau, the French national railway infrastructure manager (Plesse, 2017). This number was half
the total number of collisions per year at LXs a decade ago, but still too high. In order to significantly reduce the
accidents and lessen their related consequences at LXs, effective risk assessment means are needed urgently.
In this paper, a novel framework of Bayesian Network (BN) based Inference for Risk Reasoning (BNI-RR) is
proposed to deal with the analysis of accident causes and consequences at LXs. Besides, this framework describes a
general risk analysis process that is not limited to the LX context and can be applied to other domains. Specifically, the
present study involves: 1) developing an effective modeling framework (BNI-RR) for risk reasoning, which includes
a set of comprehensive stages, i.e., risk scenario definition, real field data collection and processing, BN model es-
tablishment and model performance validation; 2) introducing causal structural constraints to the BNI-RR framework
for the purpose of combining empirical knowledge with automatic learning approaches, so as to avoid inappropriate
structural connections and highlight main causes; 3) developing BN models and performing corresponding analysis
for French LX risk scenario using the BNI-RR framework, thus to identify potential impacting factors that contribute
most to LX accident occurrence. The underlying aim is to pave the way toward discovering practical design measures
and improvement recommendations to prevent accidents at LXs. Note that although the BN model in this paper is
developed on the basis of a quite preliminary model discussed in (Liang et al., 2017a), the methodologies to build
the models and the models themselves are completely different. Namely, the developed BN model in this paper com-
prehensively considers both static factors and motorist behavior related factors. Moreover, the established model in
this paper allows us to perform consequence evaluation based on the combination of field data and expert knowledge,
compared with only three static factors considered in the model presented in (Liang et al., 2017a).
The present paper is structured as follows: section 2 gives a review on existing related works. Section 3 recalls
the theory of probability which underlies BNs. Section 4 elaborates each stage of the BNI-RR framework. Section 5
is dedicated to the application of the BNI-RR framework to French LX risk analysis, particularly establishing and
validating the BN risk model. Section 6 analyzes and discusses the outcomes of the BN risk model and finally, some
concluding remarks and further directions are given in section 7.
2. Related work review
In current years, risk analysis approaches are required to deal with increasingly complex systems with a large
number of involved parameters. Moreover, an intelligent decision support system for risk analysis shall have the ability
of making inference based on the risk causal knowledge. Therefore, such approaches should fulfill the following
characteristics (Liang et al., 2018b):
• Having strong modeling ability,
• Having high computational efficiency,
• Providing simple means to specify a risk scenario/project,
• Offering effective reasoning between risky factors and scenario/project,
• Effectively identifying the most important risky factors.
More recently, risk analysis/safety improvement based on formal modeling, regression models, fuzzy logic and
neural networks have expanded. For example, in order to compare the effectiveness of two main Automatic Protec-
tion Systems (APSs) at LXs, namely two-half-barrier APS and four-half-barrier APS, Generalized Stochastic Petri
Nets (GSPNs) were used in (Ghazel and El-Koursi, 2014) to analyze the aleatory fluctuations of various parameters
involved in the dynamics within the LX area. Yan et al (2010) introduced hierarchical tree-based regression models
to explore train-vehicle crash prediction and analyze the impact of factors on crash frequency at passive highway-rail
LXs. Niittymaki and Kikuchi (1998) discussed a Fuzzy Logic controller for managing the timing of a pedestrian
crossing signal. The controller was designed to emulate the decision process of an experienced crossing guard.
In (Neumann, 2002), the principal component analysis is combined with Neural Networks to perform software risk
classification and discriminate high-risk projects with imbalanced data sets. Mahmoud and Katsifolis (2010) pro-
posed a classification system using a supervised Neural Network, which is applied to the detection and recognition of
intrusion and non-intrusion events at LXs. However, these approaches are unable to identify causality effectively.
Over the last decade, Bayesian network (BN) has been an increasingly popular notation used for risk reasoning
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analysis of safety-critical systems or large and complex dynamic systems, using probabilities (Liang et al., 2018b).
When making risk analysis and seeking to obtain proper and effective risk control, risk planning should be performed
based on risk causality, which can provide detailed information for decision making. In this context, a method for
software risk analysis based on BNs combining with expert knowledge and V-structure discovery algorithm was pro-
posed in (Hu et al., 2013). In (Laurı´a and Duchessi, 2006), authors discussed how to build BNs from real-world
data and incorporated BNs into decision support systems to support “what-if” analysis about Information Technology
implementations. Heuristic model searching techniques and Maximum a Posteriori (MAP) estimation are used in this
study to estimate the structure and parameters of the BN. A semi-formal method for constructing the graphical struc-
ture of BNs based on domain knowledge using the causal mapping approach is discussed in (Nadkarni and Shenoy,
2004). The causal knowledge of experts is formally represented by causal maps, so as to consider the reasoning
underlying the cause-effect relations perceived by individuals. In (Bouillaut et al., 2013), the authors discussed the
development of a decision tool realized on the basis of hierarchical Dynamic BNs (DBNs), which is dedicated to the
maintenance of metro lines in Paris. This modeling work has comprehensively described the rail degradation process,
the different diagnosis actors (devices and staff) and the decisions pertaining to maintenance actions. (Langseth and
Portinale, 2007) discussed the applicability of BNs for reliability analysis and offered an instance of BNs’ application
for preventive maintenance. Moreover, the authors of this paper discussed the advantages behind BNs as follows:
a) BNs constitute a modeling framework, which is particularly easy to use for interaction with domain experts; b)
the sound mathematical formulation has been utilized in BNs to generate efficient learning methods and c) BNs are
equipped with an efficient calculation scheme which often makes BNs preferable to traditional tools like Fault Trees
(FTs).
To sum up, the BN technique offers interesting features: flexibility of modeling, strong modeling power, high com-
putational efficiency and, most importantly, the outstanding advantages involving the conjunction of domain expertise
and automatic structure/parameters learning, causality analysis based on both forward inference (deductive reasoning)
and reverse inference (abductive reasoning) (Weber et al, 2012), as well as further influence and sensitivity analysis.
For our study, given all the interesting features characterizing BNs, we adopted this notation as the underpinning of
the BNI-RR framework that will be discussed in the sequel.
3. Bayesian networks
A BN is a graphical model that can be characterized by its structure and a set of parameters known as conditional
probability tables (CPTs) (Jensen, 1996). BN = (P,G), where P represents the parameters of conditional probabilities
assigned to the arcs, while G defines the model structure. In fact, G = (N, L) is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) that
is comprised of a finite set of nodes (N) linked by directed arcs (L). The nodes represent random variables, while the
directed arcs between pairs of nodes represent dependencies between the variables. For instance, a three-variable BN
is shown in Fig. 1. This net shows a “V” structure while the conditional probabilities of states are defined in each
node.
The semantics of BN is based on the theory of probability. Assume that there is a set of mutually exclusive events:
B1, B2, . . . , Bn and a given event A such that P (A) can be expressed as follows:
P (A) =
n∑
i=1
P (Bi) P (A|Bi) (1)
According to Bayes’ formula:
P(Bi|A) = P(Bi)P(A|Bi)∑n
j=1 P(B j)P(A|B j)
(2)
Hence, Eq. (2) can be converted into:
P(Bi|A) = P(Bi)P(A|Bi)P(A) (3)
Here, P(Bi) is called the prior probability, while P(Bi|A) is the posterior probability. Therefore, when the CPTs of
variables are given in a BN, the posterior probability can be computed.
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Node B1 Node B2
Node A
DAG
CPT in Node B1 CPT in Node B2
CPT in Node A
States of B1 and B2
States of A
P(A=1| B1=0, B2=1)
Fig. 1. An instance of a three-variable BN
For any set of random variables in a BN, the joint distribution can be computed through conditional probabilities
using the chain rule as shown in Eq. (4):
P(X1 = x1, . . . , Xn = xn) =
∏n
v=1 P(Xv = xv|Xv+1 =
xv+1, . . . , Xn = xn)
(4)
Due to the conditional independence, Xv only relates to its parent node Pa(Xv) and is independent of the other
nodes. Hence, Eq. (4) can be rewritten as follows:
P(X1 = x1, . . . , Xn = xn) =
n∏
v=1
P(Xv = xv|Pa(Xv)) (5)
4. BNI-RR framework
A modeling paradigm has to view an influential network not merely as passive parsimonious codes for storing
factual knowledge, but also as a computational architecture for reasoning about the knowledge. It means that the
links in the network should be treated as the only pathways and activation units that direct and propel the flow of data
in the process of querying and updating causal knowledge. In this section, while having in mind this principle, the
BNI-RR framework is proposed. The BNI-RR framework can be illustrated as shown in Fig. 2. Namely, the process
of BNI-RR approach consists of the following stages:
1) Risk scenario definition: before performing risk analysis and in order to set the research target, a clear definition
of the risk scenario boundary must be achieved. One should focus on this defined risk scenario to ensure that
the follow-up study does not deviate from the original intention.
2) Real field data collection and processing: for risk analysis and cause diagnosis, real field data related to the
defined risk scenario need to be collected. These data should be recorded in a workable database and used as
the basis of data processing. Data processing includes data merging/cleansing and data discretization, which is
the basis of parameters learning and CPT definition. Note that the ethics approval needs to be considered when
collecting field data.
3) BN model establishment: on the one hand, the model structure is constructed with regard to the combination
of automatic structure learning and causality constraints derived from expert knowledge (cf. 4.1). On the other
hand, the model CPTs are generated on the basis of the post-processing field data. Model structure constructing
in this stage will be elaborated in section 4.1.
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4) Model validation: the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve and the Area Under the ROC Curve
(AUC) (Hanley and McNeil, 1982) are adopted to validate the model performance of prediction. The ROC
curve is a two-dimensional graph that can be obtained by plotting the true positive rate (TPR) (Y-axis) against
the false positive rate (FPR) (X-axis) at various threshold settings (Powers, 2011). The TPR is known as the
sensitivity, the recall or the probability of detection in machine learning. The FPR is known as the fall-out or
the probability of false alarm. The ROC curve thus depicts relative trade-offs between benefits (true positives)
and costs (false positives). In order to facilitate the evaluation of classifier performance, one may want to reduce
ROC performance to a single scalar value that can represent the expected performance. A common method is
to calculate the AUC which is a portion of the area of a unit square, and the value of which falls into the interval
between 0 and 1. When using normalized units, the AUC is equal to the probability that a classifier will rank a
randomly chosen positive instance higher than a randomly chosen negative one. The ROC curve of a finite set of
samples is based on a step function, and its AUC can be computed by the normalized Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
(WMW) statistic (Yan et al, 2003):
AUC =
∑m
i=1
∑n
j=1 I(xi, y j)
m × n (6)
where xi, i = 1, . . . ,m, is the sample of positive classifier outputs; y j, j = 1, . . . , n, is the sample of negative
classifier outputs and
I(xi, y j) =
{
1, xi > y j
0, otherwise (7)
is based on pairwise comparisons between xi and y j.
Risk scenario
Accident/incident
database
Model parameters:
CPTs
Model
structure
Risk scenario
definition
Real field data
collection and
processing
BN model
Establishment
Causality discovery:
preliminary structure
learning
Causality optimizing:
causality constraints/
expert knowledge
Parameters
definition
Model
performance
validation
ROC/AUC
V 0 1
? ?
Fig. 2. The BNI-RR framework
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4.1. BN model structure constructing
4.1.1. Causality discovery
Causality is the relationship between a cause and a consequence. Identifying such causal relationships is a crucial
issue in the process of risk reasoning. In particular, a functional intelligent decision/prediction model should have the
ability of making reasoning based on causal knowledge.
For instance, in railways, potential hazards such as equipment failures, human errors and environment aspects,
may lead to incidents/accidents. Taking human errors for example, this can be expressed as a rule IF human errors
occur, T HEN accidents may occur. Therefore, the DAG GC of a causal network can be interpreted by a causal
semantics as follows:
GC = {IF,T HEN,CAK} (8)
where:
GC is a 3-tuple causal DAG;
IF is a set of causes, IF = {x1, x2, . . . , xn};
T HEN is a set of consequences caused by the causes in IF, T HEN = {y1, y2, . . . , ym};
CAK represents the CAusal Knowledge, which is a set of directed pairs of the cause xi ∈ IF and the corre-
sponding consequence y j ∈ T HEN: CAK = {(xi, y j)|xi ∈ IF, i = 1, 2, . . . , n; y j ∈ T HEN, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m}
while note that (xi, y j) is a directed variable pair that defines the structure of GC: xi → y j and cannot be
reversed, which reflects the causal relationship between xi and y j at the same time. For example, in Fig. 1,
GC = {IF = {B1, B2},T HEN = {A},CAK = {(B1, A), (B2, A)}}.
Hence, by considering the causality in the BN, the states of the target variable can be predicted even when the states
of the other factors are changed. More importantly, once a given state of the target variable occurs, the contribution of
the impacting factors can be investigated.
In practice, preliminary causality is discovered through automatic structure learning. Here we introduce six struc-
ture learning approaches that are widely used to build BN structures:
1) The Bayesian Search (BS) algorithm is one of the earliest and the most popular algorithms used. It was intro-
duced in (Cooper and Herskovits, 1992) and later was refined in (Heckerman et al., 1994). It follows essentially
a hill climbing procedure, generally guided by a scoring heuristic, with random restarts.
2) The Essential Graph Search (EGS) algorithm, proposed in (Dash and Druzdzel, 1999), performs a search for
essential graphs based on a combination of the constraint-based search and BS approach.
3) The Greedy Thick Thinning (GTT) algorithm performs based on the BS approach and has been described
in (Cheng et al., 1997). GTT starts with an empty graph and repeatedly adds the arc (without creating a cycle)
that maximally increases the marginal likelihood until no arc addition results in a positive increase (thickening
phase). Then, it repeatedly removes arcs until no arc deletion results in a positive increase in the marginal
likelihood (thinning phase).
4) The Naı¨ve Bayes approach (Good, 1965) creates a Bayesian network including its structure and parameters,
directly from data. In fact, the structure of a Naı¨ve Bayes network is not learned but rather fixed by an assump-
tion: the class variable is the only parent of all remaining feature variables and there are no other connections
between the nodes of the network. Note that the Naı¨ve Bayes structure assumes that the feature variables are
independent conditional on the class parent variable, which leads to inaccuracies when they are not independent
in reality.
5) The Augmented Naı¨ve Bayes (ANB) algorithm is a semi-naive structure learning method based on the BS
approach (Friedman et al., 1997). The ANB algorithm starts with a Naı¨ve Bayes structure (i.e., the class
variable is the only parent of all remaining feature variables) and adds connections between the feature variables
to account for possible dependence between them and conditional on the class variable. There is no limit on the
number of additional connections between the feature variables. The ANB algorithm is simple and has been
found to perform reliably better than Naı¨ve Bayes.
6) The Tree Augmented Naı¨ve Bayes (TAN) algorithm is also a semi-naive structure learning method based on
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the BS approach (Friedman et al., 1997). Compared with The ANB algorithm, The TAN algorithm imposes
the limit of only one additional parent of each feature variable (additional to the initial class variable that is the
parent of every feature variable). The TAN algorithm is simple and performs better than Naı¨ve Bayes as well.
4.1.2. Causality optimizing
In terms of causal reasoning, one can notice that model structures learned on the basis of the aforementioned
approaches are often preliminary, even make no sense of reasonability. These preliminary structures are inconsis-
tent with the causal relationships in reality, and in some cases, some connections are more likely correlations rather
than causalities in reality and impede identification of important causes. Causalities can be identified from correla-
tions, however, causalities are not equal to correlations. Many previous methods cannot achieve this important issue;
therefore, causality optimizing is indispensable to be performed based on causal constraints, for the purpose of finely
distinguishing causalities from correlations.
Pearl and Verma (1995) have stated that an intelligent reasoning system should have the competence of distin-
guishing causalities from correlations in terms of causation. Moreover, empirical expert knowledge is significant to
achieve such a distinction. Therefore, causal structural constraints (Campos and Castellano, 2007) (CSCs) generated
from expert knowledge are adopted to achieve causality optimizing in the present study.
In general, there are 3 types of directed CSCs of BNs: Existence Constraint (EC), Forbidden Constraint (FC),
and Potential Directed Constraint (PDC). For instance, given a BN N and two variables x and y of N , based on the
definition of CAK, an EC (x, y)e means that there must be a direct connection from x to y; an FC (x, y) f means that
there must not be a direct connection from x to y; a PDC (x, y)p means that if there exists a direct connection between
x and y, it should be from x to y, while from y to x is not allowed. Utilizing PDCs can control constraint granularity
and be perspicuous to describe a contrary edge orientation to an inappropriate automatic learning structure.
To sum up, adopting jointly the above directed CSCs can effectively perform combination of automatic struc-
ture learning from observational data and expert knowledge. The detailed advantages are three-fold: 1) identifying
unknown but potentially valuable causalities, especially when samples are limited, 2) verifying the already known
causalities, and 3) avoiding inappropriate connections to facilitate highlighting main causes.
5. Application
In this section, the BNI-RR framework is applied to the risk analysis of French LXs. The risk analysis is carried
out based on the real field accident/incident data collected by SNCF. In the sequel, we will discuss the various steps
of the framework.
5.1. Risk scenario definition
There are four LX types in France (Liang et al., 2017a; SNCF, 2015): a) SAL4: Automated LXs with four half
barriers and flashing lights; b) SAL2: Automated LXs with two half barriers and flashing lights; c) SAL0: Automated
LXs with flashing lights but without barriers; d) Crossbuck LXs, without automatic signaling.
As shown in Table 1 (Liang et al., 2017a), SAL2 (more than 10,000) is the most widely used type of LX in France
according to the LX data recorded by SNCF. Moreover, the accident/incident records show that more than 4,000
accidents at SAL2 contributed most to the total number of accidents at LXs from 1974 to 2014. In addition, according
to SNCF statistics, the accidents at SAL2 LXs can be considered as the most representative of LX accidents in general.
Besides, being given the number of SAL2 LXs, dealing with this LX category constitutes a priority issue for SNCF.
According to the previous statistical analysis, one can notice that the motorized vehicle is the main transport mode
causing accidents at LXs (Liang et al., 2017a, 2018a). Considering the train/motorized vehicle (train-MV) collisions,
SAL2 LXs also report the most accidents from 1978 to 2013 (Liang et al., 2017a). It should be noted that suicide
scenarios are not in the scope of our study. In what follows, we consider the risk scenario corresponding to the
situation where the “motorized vehicles cross SAL2 LXs when trains are approaching”.
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5.2. Data collection and processing
The approach for causal inference in the present study is based on field-observational-data. For the main purpose
of assessing risk level and diagnosing causes, real field accident/incident data related to the defined risk scenario need
to be collected. This is an important preparatory stage that is required prior to the establishment of the BN model. It
should be noted that, in terms of ethics approval, the data collected in the present study do not hold any personal or
private aspects. Only the agreement to install the recording devices was needed.
SNCF Re´seau investigated and recorded various attributes of LX accidents/incidents, such as railway and road-
way traffic characteristics, surrounding characteristics of LXs and then, provided two accident/incident databases to
support our study. The first database (D1) records the accident/incident data that cover SAL2 LXs in mainland France
from 1990 to 2013. From D1, the sub-dataset (SD1) including the data ranging in the decade from 2004 to 2013
is selected, which provides reliable and sufficient information about both LX accidents and static railway, roadway
and LX characteristics (considered as permanent characteristics related to LXs). Namely, the selected LX inventory
presents the LX identification number, the LX accident timestamp, the railway line involved, the LX kilometer point,
the average daily railway traffic, the average daily road traffic, the rail speed limit, the LX length and width, the profile
and alignment of the entered road and geographic region involved. There are 8,332 public SAL2 LXs included in
SD1.
According to the statistics, the majority of train-MV accidents at LXs are caused by motorist violations. Due to
the lack of accident causes in SD1, causal reasoning analysis cannot be performed with regard to the static factors and
motorist behavior. Therefore, we need to utilize another database which records detailed accident causes. Fortunately,
the second database (D2) contains the information about SAL2 LX accidents during the period from 2010 to 2013,
namely, the LX identification number, the railway line involved, fatalities, injuries, and accident causes (including
static factors and inappropriate motorist behavior). Thus, using the LX ID and the railway line ID, data merging
of these two databases is carried out to create a new database (ND) containing the LX accident information, static
railway, roadway and LX characteristics, the number of fatalities and injuries, and accident causes related to static
factors and motorist behavior. This combined database ND covers LX accidents during a period of 4 years from 2010
to 2013, which forms the basis of our present study.
The accident causes were classified into three levels: primary, secondary and third-level causes. The various causes
considered in this study are shown in Table 3. It should be noted that corrected moment (CM = V0.354×T 0.646) (Liang
et al., 2018a) which is a secondary cause, is a variant of the conventional traffic moment. The conventional traffic
moment is defined as: Traffic moment = Road traffic frequency × Railway traffic frequency (Liang et al., 2017a).
However, based on some previous analyses, we adopt CM instead. CM = Va × T b, where b = 1 − a and the best
value of a in terms of fitting is computed to be a = 0.354 according to the statistical analysis performed by SNCF
Re´seau (SNCF Re´seau, 2010). In fact, railway traffic has a more marked impact on LX accidents than road traffic.
Therefore, (V0.354 × T 0.646) is considered as an integrated parameter that reflects the combined exposure frequency
of both railway and road traffic. Moreover, data discretization is applied on continuous causal variables. Namely,
the continuous causal variables, i.e., “Average Daily Road Traffic”, “Average Daily Railway Traffic”, “Railway Speed
Limit”, “LX Width”, “Crossing Length” and “Corrected Moment”, are divided into 3 groups that each group has the
similar number of samples. As for the “Region Risk” factors corresponding to 21 regions in mainland France, they are
divided into 3 groups as well, ranked according to the risk level in descending order, and each group contains 7 region
risk factors. As for the finite discrete causal variables, i.e., “Alignment”, “Profile”, “Stall on LX”, “Zigzag Violation”,
“Blocked on LX” and “Stop on LX”, we allocate an individual state to each value of the variable.
Table 1. Accidents at different types of LXs in France from 1974 to 2014
Type of LX Number # Accident
SAL4 > 600 > 600
SAL2 > 10, 000 > 4, 200
SAL0 > 60 > 50
Crossbuck LX > 3, 500 > 700
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5.3. BN modeling
It is worthwhile to mention here that GeNIe is used as the BN modeling tool to build our BN risk model and
perform analyses related to the BN risk model. In the subsequent sections, we will go through the various steps of the
BN model development.
5.3.1. Variable definition
Based on the combined database ND, the pre-processed data of causal variables aforementioned in section 5.2
are organized as input sources which will be used to generate the CPTs of our BN risk model. On the other hand,
consequence variables, i.e., “Fatalities”, “Severe Injuries” and “Minor Injuries”, are defined respectively with two
states according to the domain expertise and the coefficient of variation (StdDev/Mean) (Reed, 2002) of the three
variables.
Besides, in our BN risk model, an additional variable corresponding to the consequence severity (EN 50126, 1999)
is defined according to the number of fatalities and injuries in a given SAL2 accident. The definition of consequence
severity pertaining to an SAL2 accident is illustrated in Table 2. Five levels of consequence severity are set according
to the number of fatalities, severe injuries and minor injuries caused by the accident, respectively. The consequence
severity increases progressively from level 1 to 5. Thus, a summary of the states corresponding to each node in the
Table 2. Consequence severity definition.
Consequence severity Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
0 = fatalities, 0 ≤ severe injuries < 2,
0 ≤ minor injuries < 3;
× – – – –
0 = fatalities, 0 ≤ severe injuries < 2,
3 ≤ minor injuries;
– × – – –
0 = fatalities, 2 ≤ severe injuries, 0 ≤
minor injuries < 3;
– – × – –
0 = fatalities, 2 ≤ severe injuries, 3 ≤
minor injuries;
– – – × –
0 < fatalities; – – – – ×
BN risk model is given in Table 3.
5.3.2. Model structure establishment
In this stage, CSCs are adopted to set up our BN risk model. As shown in Table 3, the causal variables considered
fall into two types: static factors and motorist behavior factors. We firstly identify the internal CSCs within static
factors and motorist behavior factors, respectively. Furthermore, it is worth noticing that there are some potential
connections between static factors and motorist behavior. SNCF experts provide their knowledge about CSCs between
these two types of factors, while checking the potential correlation relations. Therefore, the whole CSCs are identified
as shown in Fig. 3. In this figure, blue, red and green arcs represent ECs, FCs and PDCs, respectively. Note that
the “Consequence Severity” shown in Table 3 is a Deterministic node that is not considered in the process of CSC
identification. In order to show these CSCs more clearly, we list them in Table 4. PDCs and some FCs are suggested
by SNCF experts. With these CSCs, the final BN risk model is generated as shown in Fig. 6. In addition, CPTs are
generated based on the post-processing real field accident/incident data.
One can notice that, the BN risk model contains two layers: 1) Layer 1 is used for diagnosing influential factors;
2) Layer 2 is used for evaluating consequences related to LX accidents. The “SAL2 MV Accident” node colored in
yellow is the key node connecting the two layers, as well as the target node of accident prediction. In Layer 1, we
split the network into 2 sub-networks: the static factor related network (SFN) and the motorist behavior factor related
network (MBFN).
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Table 3. States of nodes in the BN risk model.
Node name Node property Cause type Node state
Third-level cause (TC) nodes
Average Daily Railway Traffic
(ADRT)
Chance node SF
ADRT below 9 (0 ≤ ADRT < 9),
ADRT 9 25 (9 ≤ ADRT < 25),
ADRT 25 up (25 ≤ ADRT);
Average Daily Road Vehicle
(ADRV)
Chance node SF
ADRV below 72 (0 ≤ ADRV < 72),
ADRV 72 403 (72 ≤ ADRV < 403),
ADRV 403 up (403 ≤ ADRV);
Blocked on LX (B) Chance node MBF True, False;
Stop on LX (Stop) Chance node MBF True, False;
Secondary cause (SC) nodes
Corrected Moment (CM) Chance node SF
CM below 19 (0 ≤ CM < 19),
CM 19 49 (19 ≤ CM < 49),
CM 49 up (49 ≤ CM);
Railway Speed Limit (RLS) Chance node SF
RLS below 70 (0 km/h ≤ RLS < 70 km/h),
RLS 70 110 (70 km/h ≤ RLS < 110 km/h),
RLS 110 up (110 km/h ≤ RLS);
Alignment (A) Chance node SF Straight, C shape, S shape;
Profile (P) Chance node SF Normal, Hump cavity;
Width (W) Chance node SF
W below 5 (0 m ≤W < 5 m),
W 5 6 (5 m ≤W < 6 m),
W 6 up (6 m ≤W);
Length (L) Chance node SF
L below 7 (0 m ≤ L < 7 m),
L 7 11 (7 m ≤ L < 11 m),
L 11 up (11 m ≤ L);
Region Risk (R) Chance node SF
R low (region with low risk level),
R medial (region with medial risk level),
R high (region with high risk level);
Stall on LX (Stall) Chance node MBF True, False;
Zigzag Violation (ZV) Chance node MBF True, False;
Primary cause (PriC) nodes
Motorist Behavior Accident
(MB)
Chance node MBF True, False;
Static Factor Accident (SF) Chance node SF True, False;
Consequence nodes
SAL2 MV Accident (SA) Chance node True, False;
Fatalities (F) Chance node F 0 (F = 0), F 0 up (0 < F);
Severe Injuries (S) Chance node S 0 2 (0 ≤ S < 2), S 2 up (2 ≤ S);
Minor Injuries (M) Chance node M 0 3 (0 ≤M < 3), M 3 up (3 ≤M);
Consequence Severity (CS) Deterministic node Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, Level 4, Level 5;
SF: Static factor; MBF: motorist behavior factor.
5.4. Model performance validation
Now that the BN structure is set up, we need to deal with model validation. In this section, ROC and AUC are
adopted to evaluate the prediction performance of the present BN risk model. Regarding the AUC test, we should
recall the following:
1) If AUC = 1, it is a perfect prediction model. When using it, a perfect prediction can be obtained with at least
one threshold value.
2) If 0.5 < AUC < 1, it is better than random guessing and has relatively sound predictive value.
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Fig. 3. CSCs identified for the BN risk model.
3) If AUC = 0.5, it is the same as random guessing, for example, throwing coin, thus, this model has no predictive
value.
4) Otherwise, AUC < 0.5, it is worse than random guessing and valueless; but obviously, for the reverse-prediction,
it is better than random guessing.
Therefore, one can notice that the ideal perfect ROC curve (cf. section 4) is the point (0, 1). Moreover, the closer the
AUC to 1, the better the performance of a prediction model.
Besides, the K-fold cross-validation method is used to perform validation (GeNIe, 2017) (the Deterministic node
should be excluded when performing validation). Here, we set K=2, namely, the data set is divided into two parts of
equal size and the first part is used for parameters training, while the second part is used for validation. In our BN risk
model, “SAL2 MV Accident”, “Fatalities”, “Severe Injuries” and “Minor Injuries” are the targeted prediction nodes
which we care about.
Further comparison related to the prediction performance of the 4 nodes is performed between our BN model and
the BN models automatically generated by BS, EGS, GTT, Naı¨ve Bayes, ANB and TAN. As shown in Table 5, through
investigating the results of the other 6 learning approaches, the entire accuracy and AUC values of our proposed model
are clearly better than those of the other 6 learning approaches.
Moreover, the prediction accuracy for accident/consequence occurrence is investigated to further compare the
prediction performance between our model and the 6 traditional learning approaches. As shown in Table 6, the
accuracy values for “SA = False”/“SA = True” (1/0.9622), “F = 0”/“F = 0 up” (1/0.9020), “S = 0 2”/“S = 2 up”
(1/0.6) and “M = 0 3”/“M = 3 up” (1/0.75) of our model are relatively higher than those of the other 6 learning
approaches. Note that the sample size of single accident related to “severe injuries more than 2” and “minor injuries
more than 3” is small in reality, which lead to the lower accuracy compared with the accuracy of “SA = True” and “F
= 0 up”.
The better performance of our proposed model is mainly attributed to the incorporation of expert knowledge
and preliminary causality identification. Indeed, this significantly reduces the negative effect of trivial correlations
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Table 4. CSCs for the BN risk model
ECs
(SA, F)e, (SA, S)e, (SA, M)e, (SF, SA)e, (MB, SA)e,
(CM, SF)e, (RLS, SF)e, (A, SF)e, (P, SF)e, (W, SF)e, (L, SF)e, (R, SF)e,
(ADRT, CM)e, (ADRV, CM)e, (Stall, MB)e, (ZV, MB)e, (B, Stall)e, (Stop, Stall)e;
FCs
(F, S)b f , (F, M)b f , (S, M)b f , (W, L)b f , (RSL, P)b f , (RSL, A)b f , (RSL, W)b f , (RSL, L)b f , (RSL, CM)b f ,
(CM, A)b f , (CM, P)b f , (L, P)b f , (L, A)b f , (W, P)b f , (W, A)b f , (ADRV, ADRT)b f ,
(Stop, B)b f , (ADRT, B)b f , (ADRT, Stop)b f ,(ADRT, Stall)b f , (ZV, Stall)b f , (ZV, B)b f , (ZV, Stop)b f ,
Between PriC nodes and TC nodes (bf),
Between <F, S, M> and PriC nodes (bf),
Between Consequence nodes and SC nodes (bf),
Between Consequence nodes and TC nodes (bf);
PDCs (CM, ZV)p, (R, ZV)p, (W, ZV)p, (CM, B)p, (A, B)p, (L, Stop)p, (W, Stop)p;
bf: bidirectional forbidden;
Table 5. Comparison of entire prediction performance.
Approach
SA
ACCU, AUCT , AUCF
F
ACCU, AUC0, AUC0 up
S
ACCU, AUC0 2, AUC2 up
M
ACCU, AUC0 3, AUC3 up
Our model 0.9963, 0.9846, 0.9846 0.9801, 0.9964, 0.9964 0.9982, 0.9929, 0.9929 0.9913, 0.9963, 0.9963
BS 0.8751, 0.9187, 0.9187 0.8101, 0.5708, 0.5708 0.8638, 0.9541, 0.9541 0.8657, 0.9683, 0.9683
EGS 0.9134, 0.8857, 0.8857 0.9203, 0.8306, 0.8306 0.8509, 0.7790, 0.8509 0.8917, 0.8157, 0.8157
GTT 0.8706, 0.8216, 0.8216 0.8610, 0.8213, 0.8213 0.8704, 0.7126, 0.7126 0.8713, 0.8315, 0.8315
NB 0.6356, 0.5163, 0.5163 0.7704, 0.5856, 0.5856 0.8333, 0.6012, 0.6012 0.6181, 0.2015, 0.2015
ANB 0.9287, 0.9015, 0.9015 0.9516, 0.9340, 0.9340 0.9287, 0.9111, 0.9111 0.9414, 0.9202, 0.9202
TAN 0.9539, 0.9431, 0.9431 0.9636, 0.9616, 0.9616 0.9891, 0.9680, 0.9680 0.9847, 0.9794, 0.9794
ACCU: accuracy;
and improves the reliability of the identified causal relationships among the variables considered. Therefore, these
validation results indicate that our BN risk model has relatively sound prediction performance and allow us to consider
the outcomes of the model to be trustworthy. Besides, this attests that the proposed BNI-RR framework promotes the
efficiency of risk analysis.
6. Analysis and discussion
In this section, we will illustrate how the BNI-RR framework can be advantageously worked out to perform
risk analysis on LXs. We should mention that the aspects discussed in the sequel do not represent the exhaustive
capabilities through our framework, and should be regarded as illustrations.
6.1. Forward and reverse inferences
Based on the BN risk model, one can estimate the probability of a train-MV accident occurring at an SAL2 LX
through forward inference. As shown in Fig. 4, the general probability of a train-MV accident occurring at an SAL2
over the four years influenced by the interaction of all the factors considered, is estimated as almost 0.0061. As an
illustration, the probability of a train-MV accident caused by static factors is about 0.0011 and the probability of a
train-MV accident caused by inappropriate motorist behavior is about 0.0049. Moreover, fatalities and severe injuries
caused by the accident are, to a large extent, fewer than 1 and 2, respectively (P(F = F 0) = 0.9993, P(S = S 0 2) =
0.9999). Minor injuries caused by an SAL2 accident are most likely to be fewer than 3 (P(M = M 0 3) = 0.9998).
Thus, the consequence severity level is most likely to be level 1 (P(CS = Level 1) = 0.9990).
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Table 6. Comparison of prediction performance for accident/consequence occurrence.
Approach
SA
ACCUFalse, ACCUTrue
F
ACCU0, ACCU0 up
S
ACCU0 2, ACCU2 up
M
ACCU0 3, ACCU3 up
Our model 1 0.9622 1 0.9020 1 0.6 1 0.75
BS 0.8815 0.7181 0.9101 0.6728 0.9168 0 0.9674 0.1250
EGS 0.9242 0.6875 0.9233 0.7326 0.9615 0 0.9510 0.1250
GTT 0.9562 0.7162 0.9410 0.7813 0.9704 0 0.9613 0.1250
NB 0.6905 0.5637 0.7514 0.5576 0.7334 0 0.7182 0
ANB 1 0.8011 0.9616 0.8341 0.9617 0.2000 0.9202 0.2500
TAN 0.9693 0.8437 0.9561 0.6614 0.9238 0 0.9742 0
ACCU: accuracy;
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Fig. 4. General prediction.
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Fig. 5. Prediction related to the occurrence of severest states of secondary causes.
Fig. 5 shows that the probability of a train-MV accident occurring at an SAL2 would increase to 0.0384 if all
the risky states of secondary causes occur, namely “Corrected Moment” in the “CM 49 up” group, “Railway Speed
Limit” in the “RSL 110 up” group, “Alignment” in the “S shape” group, “Profile” in the “Hump cavity” group,
“Width” in the “W 6 up” group, “Length” in the “L 11 up” group, “Region Risk” in the “R high” group, “Stall on
LX” being true and “Zigzag Violation” being true. The related consequences are likely to be severer as well. In this
way, various prediction results for the targeted nodes in terms of various combinations of the different states of the
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other impacting factors can be obtained through forward inference. Here, we do not discuss all the prediction results
due to limited space.
Subsequently, the “SAL2 MV Accident = True” state is configured as the targeted state. In this way, one can
assess the contribution degree of each influential factor to train-MV accident occurrence through reverse inference.
Detailed results are given in Fig. 6. It is worth noticing that accidents caused by inappropriate motorist behavior
contribute to 80% to the entire train-MV accidents at SAL2 LXs, while accidents caused by static factors contribute
to only 17%. As for inappropriate motorist behavior, “Zigzag Violation” is more significant than “Stall on LX”
in terms of causing train-MV accidents, because of the contribution of 58% (compared with 42% contribution of
“Stall on LX”). On the other hand, in terms of static factors, when a train-MV accident occurs at an SAL2 LX, this
LX has the probabilities of 74%, 38%, 44%, 37% and 46% respectively involved in the most risky situations that
“Corrected Moment” in the “CM 49 up” group, “Railway Speed Limit” in the “RSL 110 up” group, “Width” in the
“W 6 up” group, “Length” in the “L 11 up” group and “Region Risk” in the “R high” group. These results indicate
that more attention needs to be paid to LXs having the above risky characteristics. Moreover, special accommodation
and/or technical solutions need to be implemented to prevent motorist zigzag violations. For instance, transforming
SAL2 LXs into SAL4 LXs (Four-half barrier systems) or SAL2F LXs (two-full barrier systems), or installing median
separators between opposing lanes of road traffic in front of SAL2 LXs. As for the consequences caused by accident,
it is most likely to be 0 fatality (P(F = F 0) = 0.8875), less than 2 severe injuries (P(S = S 0 2) = 0.9789) and less
than 3 minor injuries(P(M = M 0 3) = 0.9664). Thus, to a large extent, the consequence severity would be Level 1
(P(CS = Level 1) = 0.8396, P(CS = Level 2) = 0.0292, P(CS = Level 3) = 0.0181, P(CS = Level 4) = 0.0006
and P(CS = Level 5) < 0.1125). Hence, one can set various states of the consequence nodes as the targeted states to
make thorough corresponding diagnosis of causal factors through reverse inference.
6.2. Influence and sensitivity analysis
Based on the BN risk model, the influence strength (IS), which represents the impact level of parent nodes on their
respective child nodes, can be computed through GeNIe tool using Euclidean distance (Koiter, 2006). Fig. 6 shows
the normalized influence strength (labeled on the arcs) between each pair of parent and child nodes. Fatalities (1)
has stronger influence on consequence severity than severe injuries (0.5000) and minor injuries (0.4800). Moreover,
inappropriate motorist behavior (0.7099) impacts more on LX accident occurrence than static factors (0.2899). Among
the static factors, the influence level of the region risk factor, Alignment, Corrected Moment, Width, Length, Railway
Speed Limit and Profile on LX accident occurrence decreases progressively. The result is consistent with that in the
article (Liang et al., 2018a). The reason for the slightest impact of Profile is that on the one hand, the “hump or cavity”
profile would cause an increasing risk of accidents involving long/heavy vehicles (trucks, buses, etc.), with relatively
low population. On the other hand, for most of ordinary cars, such a profile obliges ordinary cars to cross the LX
with low speed, which helps reducing the risk of LX accident occurrence (Liang et al., 2018a). In addition, zigzag
violation (0.1143) impacts more on LX accident occurrence caused by inappropriate motorist behavior, compared
with the impact of “stall on LX” (0.0137). The detailed impact of prolonged LX closure time, LX location and road
traffic density on motorist behavior is analyzed in our article (Liang et al., 2017c). Further static and time-dependent
factors shall be investigated when we will have to investigate the potential reasons for motorist violation, in the future.
Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis is performed to interpret the sensitivity of P(S A = True) to various condi-
tional probabilities of different variable combinations. The Sensitivity Tornado Diagram (STD) is shown in Fig. 7.
The top horizontal axis represents the values of P(S A = True). The vertical axis represents the general prediction
value of P(S A = True) ≈ 0.0061, which is set as the datum axis. The horizontal bars are viewed as two parts divided
by the datum axis. Green bars represent the values of P(S A = True) decreasing from the datum value while red
bars represent the values of P(S A = True) increasing from the datum value, according to the changes of impacting
conditional probabilities (Pc). As the values of Pc change within the interval [Pc − 0.1Pc, Pc + 0.1Pc] (setting the
spread degree as 0.1), the values of P(S A = True) change within an interval [P(S A = True)min, P(S A = True)max]
and distribute with respect to the changing values of Pc in the whole range [Pc −0.1Pc, Pc + 0.1Pc] accordingly. Here,
the values of P(S A = True) change within the interval [0.0045, 0.1055].
Fig. 7 shows the top 10 impacting Pcs which P(S A = True) is most sensitive to. One can notice that P(S A =
False|S F = False, MB = False) impacts P(S A = True) most. Namely, P(S A = True) decreases from 0.1055 to
0.0059 as P(S A = False|S F = False, MB = False) increases from 0.8999 to 1. As for the Pcs related to motorist
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Fig. 6. Cause diagnosis when a train-MV accident occurs
behavior, P(MB = False|S tall = False,ZV = False) (taking the second place) impacts P(S A = True) most,
compared with the other Pcs related to motorist behavior. As for the Pcs related to static factors, P(S A = True)
is most sensitive to P(S F = False|R = R high, A = S traight,W = W 6 up, P = Normal,CM = CM 49 up, L =
L 11 up,RS L = RS L 110 up) (taking the sixth place), compared with the other Pcs related to static factors. These
results further attest that the LX accident occurrence is more sensitive to inappropriate motorist behavior than static
factors. Moreover, as for motorist behavior factors, the LX accident occurrence is most sensitive to zigzag violation
occurrence, compared with other motorist behavior factors. On the other hand, as for static factors, the LX accident
occurrence is most sensitive to the riskiest states of various static factors. Therefore, the improvement measures need
to be targeted on mitigating the above high-sensitivity factors, since a small scale of improvement in such factors can
potentially reduce the LX risk as a whole on a large scale.
7. Conclusions
In the present study, an effective and comprehensive modeling framework for risk reasoning, called BNI-RR, is
proposed, which consists of a set of integrated processes, namely risk scenario definition, real field data collection
and processing, BN model establishment and model performance validation. The output of our study offers a valuable
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support for decision making regarding LX safety. Although the BNI-RR framework is applied to the risk analysis of
French LXs in our study, this framework is a general approach that can be applied to different contexts related to risk
analysis.
The main contributions of the present study are as follows:
1) A causal semantics definition is proposed to describe the DAG of BN, which consists of three elements, namely
IF,T HEN and CAK. Thus, causal structural constraints are introduced based on the concept of CAK for the
purpose of causality optimizing. With the help of causal structural constraints, empirical knowledge can be
integrated to distinguish causalities from correlations. Therefore, inappropriate connections are neglected so as
to facilitate highlighting the main causes leading to LX accidents.
2) Based on the causal BN model, we were able to make forward inference and reverse inference, which are
two valuable complementary means for performing inductive and deductive diagnosis. For instance, our BN
risk model allows us not only to predict the probability of accident occurrence, but also evaluate the related
consequence severity level, quantify the respective contribution degrees of various factors to the overall risk
and identify the riskiest factors. These aspects are rarely achieved in existing related works and demonstrate the
effectiveness of utilizing our BNI-RR framework.
3) Influence strength analysis and sensitivity analysis are two further approaches that were adopted to finely in-
vestigate the influence strength of causal factors on consequence factors and determine which causal factors the
consequence factors are most sensitive to. Based on the obtained results, adequate targeted technical solutions
and improvement recommendations can be identified to act on specific causal factors.
To sum up, the aforementioned contributions show that the BNI-RR approach offers an integrated modeling and analy-
sis framework that allows for performing thorough risk analyses. The findings obtained through applying the BNI-RR
framework on LX risk analysis offer a significant perspective on the major factors causing LX accidents and pave
the way for identifying practical design measures and improvement recommendations to prevent accidents at LXs. In
future works, dynamic BNs (DBNs) (Murphy, 2002) will be considered for further modeling the temporal situation
of some of the considered constraints nodes (railway traffic, road traffic, etc.) to improve the risk analysis prevision,
while the time-dependent conditional probabilities can be obtained. Besides, while the Bayesian Networks frame-
work is based on the probability theory, some other approaches for knowledge representation were also developed in
the past decades, considering several mathematical approaches for modeling uncertainty. If the belief functions the-
ory (Shafer, 1976) was proposed as a competitive alternative to probabilities, we can also refer to Shenoy’s work that
proposed a formal mathematical framework for representing and reasoning with knowledge, named Valuation-Based
16
Systems (VBS) (Shenoy, 1976). The graphical representation of such formalism, named valuation network (Shenoy,
1994), offers a notation that allows for capturing any uncertainty calculations. The formalism is presented by Shenoy
as an abstraction of probability theory, belief function theory and possibility theory. However, compared with the
aforementioned frameworks, DBNs can perfectly meet our expectations w.r.t the potential extensions of this work.
In addition, since inappropriate motorist behavior has been identified as the main cause of LX accidents, a thorough
analysis of this issue (e.g., further analysis on the possible influence of static and time-dependent factors on motorist
behavior with more field data) combining both qualitative and quantitative techniques will be carried out to determine
the adequate countermeasures.
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